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IDENTIFICATION OF ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA (METHODOLOGICAL ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM)

Abstract. *The aim of the study is to show the problems associated with identification of anti-communist resistance in Czechoslovakia and to suggest a methodological concept to address them. The research methodology is based on theoretical generalization of a multiannual core empirical research work. The scientific contribution is evident in the proposed methodological conception of searching for the phenomenon of anti-communist resistance in a specific historical area, not only in a connotation with the repressive measures taken by the regime, but especially in its share in the overall weakening of the regime and, eventually, its demise. The analytical core research would be “blind” and “deaf”, if it wouldn't be framed by a synthesis. This suggests, in addition, the possibility of identifying the degree of accountability of the anti-communist resistance to the downfall of the regime, and thus the possible correction of the wording of Slovak Act No. 219/2006 on the Anti-Communist Resistance. The Conclusions.* *The methodical concept of directing anti-communist resistance research indicated by the study enables understanding of the anti-communist resistance in a broader sense, including not only visibly organised anti-regime activities, but also a wide range of spontaneously emerging non-political activities. These activities gradually mutated, under the influence of a series of facts, into politicized manifestations of dissatisfaction significantly differentiated (so much so, that they could perceive each other as hostile). An opportunity to find out how the indicated resistance in all its wide-spectrum form had infiltrated into individual components and structures of the society and social groups, and thus significantly contributed to the weakening of the social base of the regime, offers itself.*

Key words: anti-communist resistance and its identification, methodology of the problem, anti-regime activities, Czechoslovakia.

ІДЕНТИФІКАЦІЯ АНТИКОМУНІСТИЧНОГО СПРОТИВУ В ЧЕХОСЛОВАЧЧИНІ (МЕТОДОЛОГІЧНИЙ АСПЕКТ ПРОБЛЕМАТИКИ)

Анотація. *Метою дослідження є вказати на проблеми, пов'язані з ідентифікацією антикомуністичного руху опору в Чехословаччині, та намітити методологічну концепцію їх розв'язання. Методологія дослідження базується на теоретичному узагальненні багаторічних базових емпіричних аналізів. Наукова новизна полягає у запропонованій методологічній концепції пошуку явища антикомуністичного спротиву в конкретному історичному просторі, і не тільки*

в конотації з репресивними заходами режиму, але особливо в площині його внеску в загальне ослаблення режиму і, нарешті, в його дезінтеграцію. За відсутності такого – синтезом рамкованого – аналітичного фундаментального дослідження, це було б «сліпо» та «глухо». Це, крім іншого, визначає можливість ідентифікації ступеня відповідальності антикомуністичного резистенсу за падіння режиму, а також можливої корекції формулювання словацького закону № 219/2006 про антикомуністичний рух опору. **Висновки.** Окреслений у статті методологічний концепт спрямування досліджень антикомуністичного спротиву, дає змогу розуміти його у більш широкому значенні, яке містить не лише видимо організовану антирежимну діяльність, але й цілу низку неолітичних дій, що вочевидь виникають спонтанно. Ці дії поступово, під впливом багатьох фактів, мутувалися на політизовані прояви незадоволення дуже диференційовано, навіть так, що взаємно могли сприйматись вороже. Таким чином, це дає можливість виявлення, як вказаний опір (у своїй широкій спектральній формі) проник у різні компоненти і структури суспільства та до соціальних груп громадськості, посприявши тим самим значною мірою ослабленню соціальної основи режиму.

Ключові слова: антикомуністичний опір та його ідентифікація, методологія проблематики, антирежимна діяльність, Чехословаччина.

The Problem Statement. Extensive theoretical reflection on the nature and character of the anti-communist resistance in former Czech-Slovak Republic literally provoked the enactment of the **third resistance**, thus creating a historical judicial precedent. It happened first in Slovakia in 2006 and, subsequently, in the Czech Republic in 2011. Both laws represented the assertion of a typically post-November radical commemorative self-reflection of former political prisoners of the 1950s, according to which the downfall of the Communist regime brought about an anti-communist resistance interpreted as a continuation of the national struggle for freedom and democracy. Even though the Slovak Anti-Communist Resistance Act of 2006 did not define this idea explicitly, to morally acknowledge the resistance members by its diction, it is directly linked to the Act No. 125/1996 on the Immorality and Illegality of the Communist Regime, which bluntly formulates the merits of anti-communist resistance on the downfall of the Communist regime (Act No. 125/1996).

From the beginning, first in Slovakia, some historians questioned the diction of the Anti-Communist Resistance Act mainly due to an imposing **black-and-white layout** of the social movement way of functioning, which *a priori* excluded the possibility of mutual intersection. By excluding certain professionally defined social groups, the law divided the society into **holders of power**, for which the law made it *a priori* impossible to reveal resistant ambitions, and **the rest of the society**, which – due to its status of subordination to power – had a high potential to implement active or passive resistance against Communism. The optics set up in this way made it impossible to identify anti-communist resistance in its infinite variety and metamorphoses. Not only personal observers, but also historical research had confirmed that joining the Communist Party was by no means evidence that the adept identified with the ideological postulates. On the other hand, the anti-communist resistance member, or any Communist dissenter, did not necessarily have to profess democratic attitudes and principles¹.

¹ Such findings were explicitly stated during the international conference on resistance and opposition against Communist regime in Czechoslovakia and Central Europe held in Prague in April 2009. Martin Tichý summarized it in the introduction to the conference proceedings, or rather Norbert Kmet' pointed out the non-conformity of some Communists, and even government employees and members of the National Security Corps, with the ideological postulates of the regime in his scientific paper on the forms of resistance among churches and believers (Kmet', 2010, p. 183). A similar disagreement in the ranks of the Communists is also confirmed by the research of different topics, for example in connection to the regime's efforts to the village collectivization (compare Varinský, 2014, p. 69).

The Analysis of Recent Researches. Historiography had started to pay increasing attention to the issue of anti-communist resistance in former Czechoslovakia, or rather Slovakia, only after 1989, i.e. after the downfall of the regime. With characteristic effort to finally carry out an objective, de-politicized history, devoid of obligatory ideology, a methodological solution to historical research was sought in an empirical description. This empirical-bound research methodology, especially in the Czech Republic after the adoption of anti-communist resistance laws, looked for expressions of resistance in every manifestation of disapproval and in resistance members (who were subsequently glorified) at all costs in an effort to update the results of its research. The activities of three institutes played an important role in this period of research: Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes in Prague, Institute of History of the Slovak Academy of Sciences (SAV) in Bratislava and Nation's Memory Institute (ÚPN) in Bratislava. These, either by themselves or in cooperation, organised several international scientific conferences between 2008 and 2011. The course of discussions at these international meetings and their published conclusions only confirmed that the research in this respect, especially in Slovakia when compared to the involvement of Czech historians, is only in its beginnings. In spite of its methodological uncertainty and relatively extensive contribution in the basic research of the issue, it has been shown that not only the whole complex of forms of resistance, but especially its theoretical evaluation, is missing, i.e. looking for an answer to what can be considered an anti-communist resistance. Subsequently, as an expression of the effort to find an answer to the question and the way out of the dead end (in which the research of the third resistance found itself) in argument with persistent self-reflection of the radical interpretation of the "third" – anti-communist resistance (for example by historian Václav Veber or, in the "softer" version, by Zora Dvořáková – searching for parallels with the 2nd anti-fascist resistance), first attempts to search for synthesizing optics as a methodological solution enabling meaningful analysis of empirical material were conducted. To the detriment of historiography, historians did not reach for their own theoretical generalizations of historical research, but as in the past when a conflict between historicist – descriptive historiography and an effort to theorize – to make historiography more scientific was being faced, a solution in theoretical instructions offered by related disciplines of political sciences and sociology is being sought. For example, the Czech historian Vítězslav Sommer, apparently under the influence of American political scientist and anthropologist James C. Scott, encourages historians not to seek heroes, but to focus on finding everyday forms of resistance. It should, however, be noted that thanks to this initiative, the theoretical reflection of the issue is considerably more developed on the Czech side. Unfortunately, the "theoretical" does not always stay a hypothesis, or rather a synthesizing framework for research, but also an ultimate goal of research, the "truthfulness" of which historians work hard to find in archives, of course only using the method of verification. Or else, factual research serves only to illustrate a predetermined form of history.

The Purpose of the Article. The aim of the scientific paper is to point out the issues associated with the identification of the anti-communist resistance and to indicate a methodological concept for their solution.

The Statement of the Basic Material. My first scientific paper dedicated to the issues of identifications of the anti-communist resistance already pointed out some of the limits that the legal diction creates (Varinský, 2009). Because the research has shown that formal approval of

the regime, also expressed by an active participation in its functioning, could only be a pretext for implementation of anti-communist ambitions. Or else, it could represent a hidden form of resistance representing a *quasi* underground for future open resistance. I am referring to cases, when active supporters of *Ludák* regime expressed an interest in joining the ranks of the Communist Party (e.g. A. Púčik²) after the war, and there is enough direct and indirect evidence to suggest it was not just an attempt to “hide” within the post-war regime. In 1959, the State Security (ŠtB) registered 9 former county and district commanders of HG (Hlinka Guard) and PO-HG (Hlinka Guard Emergency Divisions) and 2 former authorities of the State Security Headquarters in KSS (Slovak Communist Party) in the Banská Bystrica Region alone. Their activities, not only of those 11 persons in KSS already mentioned, for there were further overall 198 “former members” in high economic and political posts in the new regime according to the Department of Ministry of Interior for Regional Administration of the State Security in Banská Bystrica, were directly related to the slow resolution of the criminal liability of persons arrested in the case of the so-called Ďurčanský’s affair³. The identification of persons relevant in the *Ludák* regime was relatively simple. It was worse in the case of secret society and organisations’ members. I am referring to the Hlinka Youth Intelligence Agents⁴ (*Hlásky*), predecessors of the Slovak Secret Security (STO) and Kolarovič’s society Family⁵. Among the Hlinka Youth Intelligence Agents, or rather STO, the ŠtB had a list of ninety graduates from Hlinka Youth Higher Leadership School (VVŠ HM), who only represented a higher management structure of the intelligence network. Due to the investigation of some of them, and the subsequent cooperation, it turned out that over 300 persons, mostly women, had passed the HM Headquarters’ intelligence course. During the 1950s the ŠtB registered only 66 of them, 14 were abroad and 2 were in the Czech part of the Republic (AMISR, f. B9/II, i. No. 4: 10). After switching into second illegality, these persons worked in various unknown positions and, according to the interpretation of the ŠtB, they represented a hostile anti-communist resident network in Czechoslovakia. It was even more complicated in the case of the secret society Family. With its organisational struc-

² Albert Púčik – born 7 Oct. 1921 in Dolné Motešice, Bánovce nad Bebravou District. As a student of medicine, he graduated in 1944 from Hlinka Youth Higher Leadership School (VVŠ HM) in Belušké Slatiny. He joined KSS after the war and, simultaneously, co-operated with Dr. Š. Chalmovský’s White Guard in spreading *Slovákjournal*. Arrested on 3 Dec. 1945 and sentenced to 7 months of prison and 6 months of forced labour in labour camp. After the release in early November 1947, he left for American zone in Austria to join J. Vicen. Since this moment until his arrest on 6 Jan. 1949, he worked for J. Vicen as an agent – connection in Slovakia. In 1949, he was sentenced to life imprisonment. His sentence was altered, and together with several other Vicen’s associates (A. Tunega, E. Tesár, L. Gálik) he was executed (AMISR, P 10/3, i. No. 22; see Letz, 2008; Letz, 2010).

³ Up until 1952, no more than 60 persons were sentenced from the overall number of more than 400 arrested. Many were granted an amnesty or light sentence, or avoided conviction by constant appeals (AMISR, f. B9/II, i. No. 4).

⁴ Hlinka Youth Intelligence Organisation *Hlásky* was established circa in November 1944 from the graduates of VVŠ HM initiated and led by Dr. L. Jankovič. Members of the steering committee included J. Vicen and Dr. Š. Chalmovský from the Family. Other members included Dr. Fundárek – led the administrative and personnel matters, J. Šiky – in charge of the management of the organisation together with Dominik Kvietok. Viktor Magdolen and Kornel Piaček ensured the creation of informant network in Slovakia (AINR, 509–1–5). As a result of the coordination of the activities of *Hlásky* MNO, namely by the Head of the Intelligence Unit Maj. Alexander Matúš, the originally planned purely intelligence activities of *Hlásky* were expanded to include police operations when uncovering the Slovak National Uprising (SNP) participants as well as arresting operations carried out by the Hlinka Guard authorities and the German units (see Varinský, 2003, pp. 24-27).

⁵ ThDr. Tomislav Kolakovič, proper name Poglajen, was born 8 Sept. 1906 in Croatia. Before deciding to become a clergyman in the Society of Jesus, he studied philosophy, completed several semesters in medicine and also got his clinical practice. After completing basic clerical philosophical and theological studies, he continued his studies of Christian philosophy and sociology at university in Leuven, Belgium. At the Pontifical Oriental Institute in Rome, he completed a decree in Eastern theology and liturgy. He devoted his life to the restoration movement in the Church, to spreading the modern way of the apostolate, mainly the lay apostolate. In autumn 1943, he came to Slovakia where he created the secret society called Family to carry out his intentions. Died probably in 1990 in Paris (Vaško, 1986, p. 5, 62).

ture⁶, copying the system of cells used by Communists during illegality, became a nightmare for the ŠtB. Isolated cases of individual cells' exposure did not provide opportunity to detect the entire network of the organisation. The investigation of individuals confirmed (an important source of information were the statements of J. Vicen during his investigation in Ruzyně) that the Family members, in addition to the visible strictly non-political religious activities as private persons, had the task to infiltrate various areas of social life, without excluding KSS, implementing the plans of the Family (AINR, 509-6-1, *Anti-Communist Org. in Slovakia*)⁷. A sure, although only an indirect evidence is the case of MUDr. Šesták – Kolakovič's successor as a leading representative of the secret society Family. In 1950s, after his arrest, Šesták showed interest to cooperate with the ŠtB. However, as assessed by the ŠtB itself, no benefit from this cooperation and preparation of Šesták for intelligence activities was visible. On the contrary, a suspicion that the entire initiative's intention was to infiltrate and identify the working methods of ŠtBarose (see Varinský, 2009).

By setting a precedens for the existence of the third resistance in the above-defined interpretation, the law also pushed its historical evidence within politics of history(so to speak) at all costs. Quite naturally, the task of revealing the third resistance, in such parallels as it was carried out in the first and second versions, methodologically proposed itself to the historiography. Thus, it was traditionally perceived as a **national-liberational, democratic and, most of all, political** resistance carried out and organised in the form of opposition and resistance groups and related activities (circulation of illegal leaflets, press, intelligence or diverse activities). Although, the Czech historians accept this interpretation very differently and some even sceptically – especially regarding the national-liberational nature of the resistance (see Sommer, 2012, p. 30) – I believe that this monitored dimension has developed a very specific form in Slovakia.

The cited Act No. 219/2006 on the Anti-Communist Resistance presents the anti-communist resistance in Article 2 as a continuation of the national struggle for liberation and, as

⁶ Although written documents on the organisational structure of the Family never existed, evidence of its existence is provided by J. Vicen's protocol testimonies of 1957 – 1959, recorded during his investigation in Ruzyně. The central cell represented the managing headquarters of the Family. It was made out of about ten people, according to J. Vicen they were Dominik Bartosiewicz, Dr. Vaško, prof. Bugan, prof. Mária Pecíková, J. Šrámek, Rudolf Šesták, Dr. Chura, reportedly also Bishop Škrábik and, of course, Kolakovič as well. This headquarters, located in Bratislava, was superior to a number of unlimited primary cells, which were supposed to function as the executive body of the headquarters. These professionally organised primary cells (student, medical, clerical, legal etc.) were led by individual members of the headquarters. Only those who had closer contacts with Kolakovič and attended his lectures became members of these cells. This gave rise to cells at individual faculties and during the summer of 1944 they spread throughout Slovakia. Members of the primary cells had the duty to build in the environment they lived and worked secondary cells, composed of four to six members. According to J. Vicen, many such cells were created. However, they were not closely bound in organisational terms and the head of such a cell was under no obligation to keep lists of members. Within the organisation of the Family, they represented the last element, whose members should know they are members of Family. In principle, they were supposed to be religiously conscious people whose mission was to spread the Family's programme, thus were obliged to know its aim. The last link in the organisational structure of the Family were supposed to be the so-called tertiary cells. These, not larger than twenty-member groups, were built by only some selected members of the secondary cells. Although these cells basically no longer formed an organised group of the Family (its members were not supposed to know about the existence of the Family), they were of great importance for the realization of the Family's intentions. The organisers of these cells were obliged to religiously influence workers in various fields in order to protect them from the Communist influence. Inclusion in the different stages was governed by religious maturity, activism and reliability of said person. The lower cell controllers were not obliged to report the status of members or their names to the higher cells. Members of any cell were not supposed to know about other cells; they should only have the general idea about the Family's existence (AINR, 509-1-3, Protocol of J. Vicen).

⁷ It is necessary to add, however, that in this respect the documents of the ŠtB origin are fundamentally contradictory. For example, the report of the 1950s Main Intelligence Report mentions the dissolution of Family as a whole as early as 1952 – 1953 (compare SSA, f. HSR, No. 10442/300 I. S. Family/Report/). This contradiction is lost if we evaluate the reports in time lapse and historical context. Then, as a result of further investigation, it can be assumed that the uncovering of individual groups of the Family and the arrest of its more prominent representatives served as dissolution of the Family only under pressure from higher places, expressing the commitment to resolve the case as quickly as possible. After all, this report admits that certain residues of the Family have remained intact.

a part of the Cold War in the World, in Article 3 (Act No. 219/2006). Since it dates the beginning of this struggle back to the time of WWII, more precisely from 6 October 1944 (the Czech law cites 25 February 1948), it assumes its coexistence, not even excluding a direct merger, with anti-Nazi resistance. Although it seems contra-productive from the formal-logical point of view (the fight against Nazism was carried out in cooperation with the Red Army's advance), dialectic optics does not exclude such coexistence (contradictory unity) of anti-communist ambitions manifesting on both sides of the front line. On the one hand, national-liberating activities objectively seeming pro-Nazi appear to be anti-communist as well (i.e. by the logic of the then ongoing struggle carried out in direct cooperation with German military units), since these were objectively and subjectively directed against the arrival of the Red Army into Slovakia, or rather they tried to prevent the establishment of the Communist regime in Slovakia (I mean a spectrum of *Ludák* regime representatives' activities, which were carried out by the end of the war and were prepared for the post-war period). The perception of anti-communist resistance from this point of view enables it to be interpreted as a certain manifestation of anticipation of the WW II's evolution which, when it was over, almost immediately transformed into its Cold-War form. Once more, it was a conflict between democracy and totalitarianism, but this time, it was between two former allies of the anti-fascist coalition. It should be noted that the anti-fascist activities of the Red Army were perceived, not only in Slovakia and not without a reason, in two negative levels – as a threat of Marxist atheism to Christian tradition and, at the same time, by proclaiming the restoration of Czechoslovak statehood as a threat to the national state. However, this orientation had only a very little chance to succeed given the development of WW II. At the same time, in the case of Kolakovič's Family, the anti-communist activity from one source, in addition to the cooperation of individual members with the pro-Nazi resistance (specifically the activities of Jozef Vicen and Štefan Chalmovský among Hlinka Youth intelligence agents and STO), sought space for its implementation in active participation within anti-fascist resistance in order to gain credit for the defeat of fascism and subsequent elimination of the Communist influence on the creation of new post-war conditions. The proclaimed cooperation with anti-fascist resistance forced renouncement of national ambitions in order to maintain Slovak statehood, even though not completely, it was only put aside for the time being. A creation of post-war democratic space, in which it was assumed it would be possible to eliminate the Communist influence on the creation of state politics, became a priority (see Varinský, 2012). From our research point of view, it is irrelevant whether the legislator sought to create this space for free interpretation, anyway, the optics set enables the interpretation of anti-communist activities towards the end of the war and shortly after to be **national-liberational**, in case of their cover within anti-fascist resistance also as **democratic** and, finally, as **political**, since they pursued clear political objectives.

I admit, this interpretational concept is accepted in Slovak historiography (not to mention Czech) very demurely and, in certain connotations, even negatively. The difficulty is caused by the clearly determined long-term refusal to accept the status of the resistance member and *Ludák* resistance direction by the politics of history, apparently caused by their pro-Nazi past, visible anti-Czechoslovakism and, clearly, as a result of their ambivalent relationship to democracy. Questionable, or unresolved is, however, the issue of internal transformation of this resistance direction in political objectives of the resistance. Or rather, did the issue of re-establishment of the Slovak statehood represent the only existing problem with the issue of the regime's nature being irrelevant, or had this question been adjusted to new circum-

stances over the time? In this respect, the persistent one-sided interpretative dimension of the so-called April Agreement seems equally questionable. Historical research to date has almost forget to notice the possibility to perceive the formed “alliance” between Catholics and the Democratic Party (DS) representatives under the April Agreement as a result of efforts to seek opportunities to carry out the Slovak national interests mainly by legal means within the post-war political system of the National Front. Since the Catholics were in the alliance only to benefit from it, the weakest link of this alliance was a different attitude towards the post-war Czechoslovakia arising as a result of seeking a form acceptable for that time period, which would enable to conceal the resolution of the Slovak question. According to the 1949 Report on Slovak Political Emigration completed by Dr. Jozef Mikuš⁸ on the request of Robert Schuman, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Protestants considered the post-1945 Czechoslovak Republic to be a definitive solution, Catholics viewed it only as temporary, i.e. to be a lesser evil than its annexation by the Soviet Union (SSA, 323-13-4, Slovak emigration, pp. 21–22). The above-mentioned preference for predominantly legal means was determined, among other things, by the interest of the Family, which, in pursuit of its anti-communist resistance within the intentions of legal political space, had contributed through the Family-controlled Central Catholic Office (ÚKK)⁹ not only to the formation of this alliance, but also to its effective results during the 1946 elections¹⁰. On the other hand, ties between emigration and *Ludák* underground created in the past really existed, but there was no interest in cutting these ties. Results of the research corroborate that the activities of the Family during the war were only an organisational and ideological preparation to save Christianity from Communism-planned post-war period. Part of this preparation was also to ensure control of the *Ludák* resistance activities (STO), also planned for the post-war period, but prioritizing the restoration of Slovak statehood. Mutual contacts therefore continued in line with the planned objectives but were carried out in the most secret form¹¹. However, it was important to create a new subordination respecting the internal political possibilities. These had given a new dimension to the solution of the Slovak question, namely the anti-communist focus. Apparently, however, this was a dual task, whilst the solution to the Slovak question had already been derived from the results of the anti-communist battle. The fact that the “April Alliance” occurred in the context of the elections confirms that the issue of political power was a priority. The results of the elections in Slovakia were then perceived as proof that Slovakia voted by an overwhelming majority against Communism and yet surrendered to

⁸ Dr. J. Mikuš was one of the activists of the so-called black opposition and, although he was an emigrant in Paris as early as in 1949, he had to be familiar with the intentions of the Catholic wing in the DS.

⁹ The ÚKK ensured an operational information link between the Slovak bishops in the intentions of the Family through its members Anton Botek (director of the ÚKK) and Dominik Bartosiewicz (compare Mikloško, 1991, p. 159). It was authorized in summer 1945 as a result of negotiations between Pavel Čarnogurský and Gustáv Husák in connection with finding a leader to form a political party for the Slovak Catholics. At the same time, permission was given to publish the Catholic newspaper *Katolíckenoviny* (see Letz, 1994, p. 32).

¹⁰ According to ŠtB's evaluation of late 1950s, without the involvement of this organisation, it would be impossible to persuade the population, in such a short time, to vote for DS and not to vote by invalid ballots (according to the instructions of Ďurčanský – author's note), which would benefit the Communists (AINR, 509-6-1, Anti-Com. Org. in Slovakia: 116). For more on the direct involvement of the Family in the election campaign, see R. Letz (Letz, 1994, p. 37).

¹¹ The above-mentioned J. Vicen, who, after returning to Slovakia in August 1945, served as a co-ordinator of the forming residency of STO in Slovakia and at the same time as a connection between Family and the illegal resistance, played an important role in this respect, allowing the coordination of illegal resistance with the legal activities of the Family (compare AINR, 509–1–3, Protocol of J. Vicen, 29 June 1957: 1–3). This fact was observed by the ŠtB operative as well. This report notes the timing of the first speeches of the illegal groups with the first organised speech of the Catholic clergy against the secularization of education (SNA, PV – presidium/1946, box No. 37, Summary Report on the Detected...).

Moscow's usurpation only thanks to the Czechs. According to the above-mentioned report of Dr. J. Mikuš, the Czech surrender to Communism, unprecedented among Central-European nations, led in Slovakia to a serious cut in the number of supporters of the joint state. Thus, not only in Ďurčanský's interpretation presented abroad¹², but also in domestic circumstances represented by the Catholic wing of the DS, the battle against Czech central power was perceived as an anti-communist struggle. This idea was explicitly formulated by J. Mikuš in the conclusion of the aforementioned report when he wrote that the Slovaks are fighting both against Communism and for their national liberation (SSA, 323-13-4, Slovak emigration, p. 27). The previously mentioned interpretation suggests, although this political concept implemented in a very secret form will be quite problematic to empirically prove by the direct method, that the anti-communist resistance had a rational dimension to it in Slovakia already during this period, which significantly differed from the anti-communist resistance in the Czech part of the country. By overlooking these well-known facts from documents, the historians, paradoxically, in an attempt to highlight the unfair Communist practices in the ongoing power struggle, apparently unknowingly and, unfortunately, still continue to overlook and question not only the basics of forming anti-communist resistance¹³, but also the manifestations of state-forming activities, which could only be carried out in high secrecy, i.e. in the context of possibilities offered during that time. A certain, though not much happier attempt to bring new perspectives into this issue was represented by the initiative of Ján Bobák, who used the previously unknown diary of Rudolf Komandera¹⁴ for this purpose. To the detriment of Slovak historiography, Bobák used a very controversial form of communication, which led not only to the rejection of the chosen form, but also its content that offered new possibilities of interpretation (Medvecký, 2013, pp. 119–124). But no matter how it was like with the past political ambitions of the Slovak Revolutionary Resistance abroad (organised by

¹² F. Ďurčanský, both in the General Guidelines for Domestic Activities of 1946 and later in the White Book published in 1954, identified the Beneš regime (the People's Democratic regime, or more precisely the National Front regime – author's note) with the Communist regime, and as a result the Communism merged with the fight against Czech imperialism in his eyes, or rather as he used to say "against the temporary Czech occupation" (Ďurčanský, 1991–1992, p. 892). It should be added, however, that the battle against Communism did not certainly belong to the priorities of Ďurčanský's political concept, since the issue of the political organisation of the Slovak State had never been theoretically elaborated and presented by Ďurčanský. According to J. Vicen's protocol testimonies of 1957 – 1958, Ďurčanský was indifferent towards this issue (compare AINR, 590–6, Political activities of the Slov. Emigration, p. 9). On the contrary, according to what J. Kirschbaum wrote, it was a deliberate lack of interest, as the Slovaks were primarily concerned with the independence of the state (compare Kirschbaum, 1994, pp. 42–45, cited by Špetko, 1994, p. 169). This unilateralism in Ďurčanský's political concept, shared by most of the Ludák exile, put separatist emigration in complete political contradiction with allies, where seeking personal support, legal protection and political ground for their activities (compare Špetko, 1994, p. 166). It can be assumed that it was one of the causes of the gradually weakening influence of Ďurčanský and his supporters in exile.

¹³ For example, Jablonický, in the case of T. Kolakovič, purposely disputes the results of the ŠtB's investigation, which confirmed the ideological connection of Kolakovič with the uncovered anti-state activities of Dr. Štefan Chalmovský, despite the fact that this connection was confirmed by the testimonies of brothers Jozef and Augustín Hubovec. All similar statements, which in the context of revealed anti-state activity showed Kolakovič in a negative point of view, Jablonický marks as manipulated by investigators and, vice versa, those that confirmed Kolakovič's innocence as true (compare Jablonický, 2000, pp. 44–47, 51). Again, this effort seems counterproductive with the results of an investigation of Jozef Vicen 11 years later (1957 – 1958) (compare AINR, 509-1-3, Protocol of J. Vicen / 1 June 1957/, p. 6). After all, the link between Kolakovič and the anti-state activities of Š. Chalmovský is pointed out in the newly published diary of Komandera, in which he states (it must be noted that without the pressure of the ŠtB) that Chalmovský's resistance movement was supported by several state officials, but mainly Dr. Kolakovič (Bobák, 2012, p. 458).

¹⁴ R. Komandera, even though Lutheran, was a member of those former "Hlásky", who emigrated prior to the approach of the front and, together with Dr. L. Jankovič, formed the Slovak Revolutionary resistance (SRO). In 1946, considering that the SRO did not have sufficient number of volunteers willing to travel as messengers to Slovakia, Komandera accepted the position of a messenger. He took his first trip in 1946 according to the instructions of Dr. L. Jankovič in order to evaluate the political situation and the possibility of starting the resistance work (compare Bobák, 2012).

Dr. L. Jankovič), the research of the *Ludák* emigration confirms that one part of this resistance group, represented by Dr. Jozef Mikula¹⁵ with J. Vicen, later fully independent and as an intelligence co-operating with the American party, was forced to put anti-communism as a first item on its political agenda for existential reasons, thus putting the issue of the restoration of Slovak statehood second (Varinský, 2017, p. 47). Although, the sources do not offer explicit evidence, it cannot be ruled out that, even in this case, its solution was directly linked to the defeat of Communism (see: Varinský, 2003; Letz, 2017; Zelenay, 2012).

Let us now look at how the Czech and Slovak historiography has responded to the new interpretation set by legislation. Just as immediately after November 1989, after the adoption of the above-mentioned laws, there had still been an effort to carry out historical research more or less through an empirical description, which have been wrongly considered to be the application of the methodology of positivism. Among the causes of this situation are the post-November absence of theoretical preparation, resulting in an overall value and ideological disorientation of historians, and especially the effort to create a somehow objective, de-politicized history, deprived of compulsory ideology. Unfortunately, not even this ongoing aim of historians could be executed, as it did not satisfy either side of an objectively divided socio-political reality. “History” without a resourcefulness of the historian and his visible strength in value, additionally enclosed in its academic form, does not guarantee the meaning of a full interpretation of history. It could not fulfil its social function, because it did not deal with current issues. Again, an alternative solution to the situation has been offered by the politics of history by the diction of the earlier cited anti-communist resistance laws. An ideologically motivated space for the involvement of historians in interpretation was created. Mainly because of this, the empirical-bound methodology of anti-communist resistance research, in an effort to update the results of its research, found manifestations of resistance in every demonstration of disapproval and resistance fighters, subsequently glorifying them¹⁶. It cannot be ruled out that, especially in Slovakia, an exile interpretation offered a certain pattern in this respect. For example, Dr. Jozef Lettrich’s book entitled *History of Modern Slovakia*, first published in 1955 in the USA and in 1993 in Czechoslovakia, presents the anti-communist resistance in a largely glorified form as part of the nation-wide resistance, while considering various demonstrations of social incompetence (e.g. deficiencies in work ethics, etc.) to be manifestations of resistance¹⁷. Likewise, some Czech historians (e.g. Tomáš Bursík) in an effort to define the term anti-communist resistance and give this phenomenon the widest possible scope of interpretation, incorporate all possible activities, including spontaneous (i.e. unconscious) society’s manifestations of resistance during major events, or rather agricultural and industrial sabotage¹⁸ etc., into this purely political phenomenon (Bursík,

¹⁵ Dr. Jozef Mikula was the chairman of the Association of the University Students (ZVŠ) during the First Slovak Republic. He emigrated to Kremsmünster in Austria together with the leaders of the First Slovak Republic in March 1945. He was taken into captivity and transferred to Germany. After proving that he was not a member of the Slovak army, he was released. He returned to Austria, where he met P. Lyon through the wife of K. Murín (she worked as an interpreter for the Counter Intelligence Corps /CIC/). Since then, he worked for the CIC as an adviser on the Central-European issues, especially Slovakia (AINR, 509–1–3, Protocol of J. Vicen, 14 June 1957).

¹⁶ V. Sommer, in his reflection on how to get the historiography of the third resistance out of the dead end in an attempt to decisively reject this politicized empiricism, albeit paradoxically but quite logically, considers the most empirical description of the selected topics to be the most beneficial (Sommer, 2012, p. 10).

¹⁷ The author writes about extensive nationwide anti-communist resistance, which he sees as an internal activity, while the third Czechoslovak (anti-communist) resistance was supposed to operate in a free world (Lettrich, 1993, pp. 225–226).

¹⁸ In addition to these facts, it should be stated that in most cases recorded in agriculture, these were not the result of politically motivated intentions but rather the inability of immediate producers to carry out bureaucratic tasks as perceived by the regime (compare Varinský, 2014).

2010, p. 17). After all, the aforementioned V. Sommer, as a way out of the dead end radical interpretation of the third resistance got into, encourages historians not to seek heroes, but to concentrate on the whole spectrum of the population's responses to the challenges of communism, or more precisely to search for everyday forms of resistance (Sommer apparently adopted this idea from the American political scientist and anthropologist James C. Scott) (Sommer, 2012, pp. 13–16, 35). Although historiographically it is extremely problematic to speculate about some kind of national resistance, more precisely about Bursík's civil war (Bursík, 2010, p. 19, 23), the selected models also implicitly offer a new methodological dimension of reasoning, namely the fact that non-political activities may also become a political force. However, it will be very important to distinguish in which connotations we can speculate about something like this.

Contrary to this, parallel research into the repressive measures of the totalitarian regime has shown that the regime created its own opponents, at least until 1953, not only by its Communist intentions and violent methods used, but also by the applied ideological postulates. In a way, it considered the growing opposition of class enemies – anti-communists in the spirit of Stalin's perverted thesis of intensifying the class struggle for socialism to be one of the conditions of its existence and progress. Nowadays, there is a number of evidences supported by research¹⁹. For example, the research of anti-communist organisations of the White Legion in Slovakia confirmed, by several indirect indications, not only the encouragement of the already exposed groups or individuals opposing the regime to carry out anti-communist activity, but in one case even suggested a possible direct participation of the ŠtB in the establishment of anti-communist organisation White Legion – 3 in Eastern Slovakia (Varinský, 2006). Such activity of the political police was not allowed even in the Communist regime, but the system-realized thesis on the intensifying class struggle for socialism “forced” the ŠtB authorities in their own way, if they did not want to risk accusations of delaying socialist progress, thus becoming victims of suppression themselves, to carry out such activity in top secrecy. Of course, this was not the case of a transformation of the ŠtB members into anti-communist resistance fighters unintentionally carried out by the regime, but merely an attempt to prove the validity of perverted ideological postulates, with the personal gain of the investigators themselves being another significant element. Likewise, those who became part of such games were in most cases, undoubtedly, only victims of the regime and less of a *de facto* resistance fighters (many later rehabilitated), although after the downfall of the regime, in their recollection they currently include themselves into this category. The victims suddenly became resistance fighters. Later, after the thesis on the intensifying of class struggle for socialism had gone into the past, judging at least by the source material of official provenance (State Security files) in Czechoslovakia, there was, with some exceptions, no open and organised resistance detected (Sommer, 2012, p. 16). Individual and natural resistance are more often observed. Interesting is thus the opinion of the representative of a radical interpretation of the “third resistance”, Czech historian Václav Veber. He claims that in the conditions of developed totalitarianism, the resistance *de facto* did not exist. This is explained by the fact that the regime's practices, including oppression, had been carried out in absolute range not by fanatics but by normal, that is, ordinary people (Babka – Veber, 2002, pp. 16–17, cited by

¹⁹ Among other things, the regime's attitude towards rich farmers, the so-called Kulaks, who, even after 1953 (after Stalin's death), were prevented from participating in any kind of forced collectivization changes, and thus at least hid themselves from the retaliations. It would be very exaggerated to consider this group of population to be a priori anti-communists, only the reprisals of the regime provoked hatred in them and, consequently, more or less hidden opponents of the regime. The question is when and in what time span.

Bursík, 2010, p. 19). Veber thus obviously unknowingly pointed out an important fact – the difference between a classical dictatorship and totalitarianism. Unlike the classical dictatorship, the totalitarian regime is not satisfied with the political passivity of citizens, but requires their active political support. In order to achieve full identification with the regime, it seeks, as a matter of priority, a total control over the citizen by ideological instruments. In an effort to ideologically isolate the citizen from other ideological influences, it led an irreconcilable war against religion. At the same time, again unknowingly, pointing out differences in the scope of the 2nd and 3rd resistance, he drew the attention to the differences in the leadership of the resistance against the regime established by a foreign power (for example the regime of the Protectorate) and the regime that had arisen, so to speak, especially in the Czech lands, from domestic sources.

If we fully accepted Veber's point of view, we would have to conclude that there was no organised anti-communist resistance²⁰, or rather only in a very marginal and barely identifiable form, perhaps exclusively during the early years of Communist rule. Adopting this interpretative dimension would make it considerably more difficult to answer the question what did actually overthrow the regime and it would essentially challenge the diction of the above-cited Act No. 125/1996 on the Immorality and Illegality of the Communist Regime, expressed in Article 3. Yet, contrary to the previously outlined Veber's optics, the above-mentioned exceptions to organised disagreement with Communist practices can be identified. I am referring here to the secret (hidden) church, but especially to the lay apostolate. This institution, not only at the time of the establishment of totalitarian regime still within the intentions of Kolakovič's Family, but also later, almost exclusively through religious activities, objectively weakened the ideological and thus social basis of the regime. In this sense, a hidden organised form of anti-communist resistance can be recognized in the lay apostolate. Historiographic research to date suggests that this form of resistance persisted, except for short periods of time enforced by repressive regime interventions, in various metamorphoses until the end of the regime. In this respect, the activities of Vladimír Jukl, Silvester Krčméry and others inside the later established Fatima Circle can be identified as a hidden form of organised and relatively mass resistance within the intentions of Family²¹. According to the Report on the State Security Situation in the Slovak Socialist Republic (SSR) for 1988, on the basis of monitoring the activities of the secret church, the ŠtB assessed the social base of this institution to approximately 3,000 laypeople (1988. Rokpredzmenou, 2009, p. 203). The fact that this non-political activity was not just a political force constructed by the ŠtB was confirmed by later events in 1988 predating the downfall of the regime, namely a signing event in support of the demands of Moravian Catholics for freedom of the church (a petition of 31 requests was compiled by Augustín Navrátil), but especially the Candle Demonstration in Bratislava.

It should also be added that by signing the Helsinki Accords in 1975 and with it the so-called third basket devoted to respecting civil rights, a new space for drawing gradual attention to a general but very differentiated feeling of dissatisfaction was created, although unwillingly, by the representatives of power even in the totalitarian regime. They were not only those the regime had previously perceived as potential opponents, but also the rest of the forming civic public which, again in a differentiated manner, could essentially be loyal, or more precisely

²⁰ Most historians of the older generation believe that considering anti-communist resistance in the bipolar world has no foundation, as from around mid-1949 there was no interest by Western democratic power in supporting armed coup in Central and Eastern European countries (Bursík, 2010, p. 17).

²¹ The Fatima Circle was established as a secular institution in Slovakia in 1974 on the initiative of V. Jukl and S. Krčméry, fully in the intentions of the ideological legacy of prof. Kolakovič.

have an indifferent attitude towards the regime, but demanded correction of the issues still unresolved by the regime. The spectrum of dissatisfied people was quite wide and infiltrated, albeit in a latent form, all strata of society, including the Communists (not only the so-called reform Communists, those affected by *normalization*). This created space for a new form of visible opposition. It is how, in the Prague reform Communist and intellectual environment, Charter 77 was created two years after the signing of Helsinki Accords, which came up with an unconventional visible form of resistance. The peculiarity of this visible resistance was, according to Ján Budaj, an effort to suppress the regime by mentioning its own ideals (Budaj, 2009, p. 113). In terms of the number of those involved, it was a very small group, which according to the ŠtB, apart from culture and information resources, could in no way undermine the state and social structures. In the ten years since the founding of the Charter, the number of signatories had increased to about 1,800 people, but most of them used their signature as a form of declaration of their attitude and had not pursued any politically motivated opposition activity (Lorenc, 1992, p. 100). Moreover, by ignoring the Slovak question and the constitutional arrangement, it did not find wider support in the Slovak environment and thus remained more or less a “Czech affair”²². It can be assumed, and research must prove that this had become one of the causes of unsuccessful attempts to create a broader common platform – unifying the Czech and Slovak dissent. This also seems to explain the relatively low number of activists from Slovakia in the newly formed, openly politically oriented opposition group Movement for Civil Freedom (HOS), whose founding members were 130 (or 126) nationwide, of which approximately 9 were from Slovakia. Later, several more joined the group and according to Dubovský their number had risen to about 25²³. In this respect, it will be important to find out how the Slovak question had established itself into the demands of the leader of the Slovak part of the HOS Ján Čarnogurský, expressed at Bradlo on 7 May 1989 for restoring the Štefánik tradition and returning the traditional Slovak coat of arms into the Czechoslovakian one, for which he was also accused of favouring and promoting fascism (Dubovský, 2012, pp. 212–213).

By far, however, this above-mentioned dissent, monitored by ŠtB as a priority, was not the only one. In the second half of the 1980s, Gorbachev’s perestroika created space for the establishment of several various “opposition” groups. The pacifist activities of the young generation were organized in various peace movements and clubs as well as various environmental groups. According to Milan Otáhal, since 1987 the number of dissident groups in Czechoslovakia increased from the original 5 to 39 in August 1989 (Otáhal, 1994, p. 70, cited by Balun, 2009, p. 32). This increase of non-political (at least on the outside) opposition activity, enabling to relieve tension in liberal society, was devastating for the totalitarian regime. A difficult situation arose for the State Security forces, forcing them to look for new forms and methods of work. On the one hand, it was a manifestation of change in the social system in the whole Eastern Bloc and was not to be restricted in this respect, but at the same time it created a presumption of its abuse for political purposes²⁴. It was therefore important

²² In his recollection of 1988, J. Budaj expressed doubts as to whether it was conscious or subconscious intention to carry out the Charter 77 as an expression of national, Czech resistance (Budaj, 2009, p. 115).

²³ HOS was founded on 15 October 1988 in Prague on the initiative of Rudolf Battěk. The Democracy for All HOS’s Manifesto was signed at the time of its creation in Slovakia by J. Čarnogurský, Anton Selecký, Hana Ponická, Ján Langoš, Ivan Hofman, Milan Simečka, Miroslav Kusý, Jozef Jablonický and Vladimír Maňák (compare Dubovský, 2012, pp. 210–211).

²⁴ Compare the report submitted in February 1988 by the Federal Minister of Interior František Kincl to the praesidium of the Central Committee (ÚV KSS): February 1989, Prague. Report on the State Security Situation in the SSR in 1988. Report on the State Security Situation in the Slovak Socialist Republic in 1988 (1988. Rok pred zmenou, 2009, p. 202).

to bring these activities under control by strengthening the operative measures. Although the State Security forces did not consider most of these organizations dangerous for the state, nor did they qualify the activities of Charter 77 as resistance²⁵, they perceived them as the activity of anti-socialist forces and potential threat to the regime, and therefore as a special form of resistance²⁶. However, the elimination options, in particular of the Charter, due to the greatly counterproductive consequences of the use of force, were severely limited by the commitments made in Helsinki. Therefore, the focus was more on intelligence infiltration by agents and redirecting to the non-political, rather ecological area²⁷. And while such political leaders had managed to temporarily sustain the growth of dissatisfaction in the form of regime-tolerated loyal opposition, the preconditions for its gradual internal erosion had been created. The plurality of opinion created, initially put forward as an intention to humanize (improve) the totalitarian regime, was in fact the beginning of its end.

The mode of resistance, deliberately realised in an externally non-political form, merely by seeking public dialogue with power and with the secret aim of revealing it as unable to solve the current problems of society, ultimately led to provoking deep scepticism spreading to all structures of society, and *a priori* we cannot exclude individuals in the party apparatus. As I suggested earlier, I think, and research will have to verify it, this scepticism, expressed in wider, often individual and in particular spontaneous manifestations of dissatisfaction, had not, in most cases, an anti-regime form in its origin (born and performed in the purview of Gorbachev's glasnost), but objectively weakened the social base of the regime. Perhaps I will not be far from reality if I assume that, together with increasing scepticism, even in the party structures themselves, it created conditions for the internal revolution of the regime in a "velvet way".

The Conclusions and Prospects for Further Study of the Issue Discussed. The outlined concept of the methodological direction of anti-communist resistance research allows, although not in line with the diction of the above-cited laws, to understand anti-communist resistance in a broader sense, including not only visibly organised anti-regime activities, but also many explicitly non-political activities arising spontaneously. These activities, although not having *a priori* anti-regime nature determined in the historical context by Gorbachev's perestroika, gradually, under the influence of other facts (also due to the inability and unwillingness of political elites to start perestroika in Czechoslovakia in bolder dimensions) mutated into politicized manifestations of dissatisfaction. In the context of the political crisis of the regime and the search for reform alternatives to the regime, there is polarization in the very core of the so-called power holders²⁸. Paradoxically, the Communists also get into the social base of critics of the regime, i.e. also those whose ambition was not a parliamentary democracy, but, as in 1968, only the improvement of the regime.

²⁵ It cannot be ruled out that this is only an issue of semantics of the term, as only foreign activities were perceived as resistance.

²⁶ For example, the Charter deliberately emphasized its apolitical point of view, but the ŠtB perceived the political nature of the people in the Charter as hidden behind the imperative of morality and human rights. It sought public dialogue in which it pursued public questioning of the Communist Party's policies, thus acting as a political opposition (compare Lorenc, 1992, p. 100).

²⁷ A. Lorenc acknowledges an infiltration as an agent into the Charter at the time of its establishment, with the network of agents still being supplemented later on. Similarly, it also infiltrated into various political groups initiated by the Charter, or rather it created such groups itself to prevent them from being politicized and confronted with the regime (compare Lorenc, 1992, pp. 100–102).

²⁸ Oskar Krejčí's speculations also support the outlined concept of thinking: "Among the members of the Communist Party, both in factories, offices, the State Security and the KSC apparatus, a despair and desire for change prevailed long before the Velvet Revolution. The demand for change was expressed by most Communists in private conversations or public opinion polls – that is, only a little specifically, unorganised, non-politically" (Krejčí, 2014, p. 15).

As early as at a 2009 conference on resistance against the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia held in Prague, the presentations of the experts clearly stated that the anti-communist resistance displays a very differentiated manner, so much so that its individual components can have a mutually hostile relationship.²⁹ If we had a problem with the “digestion” of such an optics of research, I would only remind you that even one of the toughest supporters of the radical interpretation of the anti-communist resistance, Václav Veber in his scientific paper, apparently under the influence of Lech Wałęsa, admits that after eliminating the armed resistance into non-existence, the resistance infiltrated into the Communist movement, where an increasingly strong opposition was born into the party and other branches of power taking over the resistance (Veber, 2012, p. 345).

The research thus offers an opportunity to find out how the implied resistance in all its broad-spectrum form infiltrated into various components and structures of society and social groups of the civic public, and it is possible to assume that this had contributed significantly to weakening the social basis of the regime. Essentially, it is an acceptance of the methodological concept of Vítězslav Sommer, which, following the methodological concept of resistance presented by American political scientist and anthropologist James C. Scott (Sommer, 2012, pp. 13–16), came up with the concept of everyday, non-public hidden resistance carried out without visible political activities. He thus expanded the classical interpretation of resistance (opposition), carried out in the form of collective and organised actions, by the hidden individual and mostly unaware forms of resistance. But beware, this methodology research of the everyday life has a certain danger in it. Again, it offers a possibility to reveal resistance at any cost as being nationwide, and therefore in such activities which were neither subjectively nor objectively anti-communist in nature. Or otherwise metaphorically, so that we would not consider using Lenin’s writings in the lavatory due to lack of toilet paper to be an act of anti-communist resistance. But in principle this cannot be excluded either. Research-confirmed connotation with the historical context in which it takes place is important.

In other words, the same event may have a completely different meaning in another historical context. It will therefore be important to assess how much these activities had contributed to the overall weakening and deepening of the regime’s crisis. Thus, the answer to the question offers itself. Is it even possible, from the point of view of a methodological concept like this, to work with some kind of *a priori* created definition of anti-communist resistance by fellow sociologists, political scientists etc.? I believe that any such attempt will only lead to annihilation of the historical image, as factual research will merely illustrate a predetermined form of history. It remains a duty for us to look for this phenomenon in a specific historical space, not only in connotations with the repressive measures of the regime, but especially in terms of its contribution to the overall weakening of the regime and finally its dissolution.

Although we work with abstractions to navigate the often controversial history, let us not forget in the spirit of Goethe’s message that “theory is grey and eternal green is the tree of life”. Thus, the importance of the historian’s intellectual abilities is increasingly important. Only from them (not from what the sources/documents offer) will depend what methodological concept will be applied when working on such complex themes. It may sound paradoxical, but in the dialectical meaning of the word, subjectivity in the historical image, perceived as a meaningful interpretation by the historian, is one of the basic preconditions for his

²⁹ The conclusions of the conference are summarized by Martin Tichý at the beginning of the conference proceedings *Resistance and Opposition Against the Communist Regime in Czechoslovakia and Central Europe* (Odboj a odpor., 2009, p. 10).

objectivity. We are not looking for an irreversible form of the historical image, and not at all with a timeless dimension, we just try to produce a meaningful interpretation. But how can we carry out meaningful analytical research without the risk of slipping into a dead end, if there is no synthesizing perspective of history? This is an issue the latest historiography will have to deal with for some time, no matter what the subject of research focusing on the second half of the 20th century will be. That is also why I have taken this consideration to compensate, at least in part (although not sufficiently eloquently), for the existing handicap.

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